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FEATURE COMMENT: Rethinking The 
World Bank’s Sanctions System
The World Bank is reviewing its system for sus-
pending and debarring contractors (known formally 
as the World Bank sanctions system). The system 
is used to sanction contractors that have engaged 
in fraud or corruption (and other enumerated bad 
acts) related to Bank-financed projects. The World 
Bank sanctions system proceeds in stages—inves-
tigation, review, sanctions and possible remedial 
efforts—which appear unlikely to change, in any 
fundamental way, under the current review. The 
World Bank has, however, invited public comment 
on the incremental changes which have been pro-
posed.
As the discussion below reflects, although the 
proposed reforms are potentially quite significant, 
the Bank has not yet assessed its “first principles”—
its goals, and the costs and benefits of meeting those 
goals. Nor has the Bank released the data necessary 
for completing that assessment. After reviewing the 
sanctions process, and identifying what appear to 
be the Bank’s current goals in its sanctions system 
(stemming reputational and fiduciary risks), the 
discussion below recommends that the World Bank 
defer finalizing any reforms until it concludes its 
assessment of first principles, and has at hand all 
the data necessary to assess the sanctions system 
against those first principles.
How the World Bank reforms its sanctions 
system is important, both to contractors work-
ing on World Bank projects and to the broader 
developing world. The World Bank finances tens 
of billions of dollars in procurement every year, 
across the globe, and its procurement guide-
lines—and its sanctions system—offer important 
models for nations and institutions building new 
systems to fight corruption in procurement. See, 
e.g., UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Guidebook on 
Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the 
Management of Public Finances: Good Practices in 
Ensuring Compliance with Article 9 of the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (2013); 
Rose-Ackerman, “International Actors and the 
Promises and Pitfalls of Anti-Corruption Reform,” 
34 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 447 (2013).
Understanding the World Bank’s Sanc-
tions System—The sanctions system at the World 
Bank, see “World Bank Sanctions Procedures” 
(April 15, 2013), available at go.worldbank.org/
CVUUIS7HZ0; Green, International Government 
Contract Law § 5:20 (West 2013), was shaped in 
part by recommendations from former U.S. At-
torney General Richard Thornburgh. See, e.g., 
Fariello and Daly, “Coordinating the Fight Against 
Corruption Among MDBs: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Sanctions,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
253, 258 (2013). And, as the table below reflects, the 
World Bank system in many ways resembles the 
U.S. federal system. See, e.g., Priess, “Questionable 
Assumptions: The Case for Updating the Suspen-
sion and Debarment Regimes at the Multilateral 
Development Banks,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
271, 272–73 (2013).
As with the U.S. federal system, see Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation subpt. 9.4, 48 CFR subpt. 9.4, 
the World Bank sanctions process is self-contained 
and stands apart from any criminal or civil pro-
ceedings. See generally Dubois, “Domestic and In-
ternational Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud 
and Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension 
and Debarment with the World Bank’s Sanctions 
System,” 2012 U. Chi. Legal Forum 195; Williams, 
“The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World 
Bank-Financed Contracts,” 36 Pub. Cont. L.J. 277 
(2007). The World Bank system, like the U.S. sys-
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tem, affords due process protections to contractors 
and individuals under review, see, e.g., de Chazournes 
and Fromageau, “Balancing the Scales: The World 
Bank Sanctions Process and Access to Remedies,” 23 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 963 (2012), and results in a “general” 
bar—it is not a contract-by-contract exclusion system.
Unlike the U.S. federal system, however, the 
World Bank sanctions system is highly adjudica-
tive. See, e.g., World Bank, “Sanctions System at 
the World Bank” (“[T]he World Bank’s sanctions 
system consists of a two-tier adjudicative pro-
cess, with a first level of review carried out by the 
Bank’s Suspension and Debarment Officer (SDO) ... 
and, for contested cases, a second level of re-
view by the World Bank Group Sanctions Board, 
an independent body with a majority of exter-





U.S. Federal Procurement  World Bank  
Causes of Debarment  Broadly defined (for discretionary, 
i.e., non-“statutory” debarments) 
Per Guidelines:  a corrupt, fraudulent, 
coercive, collusive or obstructive practice 
Referral and Sources of 
Evidence  
Any source; any investigation Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) investigation; 
redacted reports provided to third parties  
Temporary Suspension  Allowed, e.g., notice of proposed 
debarment  
Allowed, if sufficient proof  
Standards for Debarment  Preponderance; then contractor must 
show responsible (qualified) 
Preponderance, ultimately by Sanctions 
Board  
Hearing  Yes  Yes, before Sanctions Board  
Resolutions (range) Debarment to Administrative 
Agreement  
Debarment to Settlement (reviewed)  
Cross-Debarment  All federal agencies  All multilateral development banks  
Judicial Review  Yes  No  
 
Although federal suspension and debarment 
officials retain substantial discretion (at least in 
matters which are not subject to mandatory statu-
tory debarment), their World Bank counterparts 
serve in a role much more like an administrative 
judge’s. Cf. Dubois and Nowlan, “Global Administra-
tive Law and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes 
in International Law,” 36 Yale J. Int’l L. Online 15 
(2010) (arguing that World Bank sanctions system 
works best if it incorporates principles of global 
administrative law). 
As the accompanying diagram (Figure 1) explains, 
the World Bank suspension and debarment officials 
receive reports from the investigators in the World 
Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), and, based 
upon the available record, the suspension and debar-
ment officials must recommend an appropriate sanc-
tion, subject to review by the Sanctions Board. See, 
e.g., Dubois, “The Litigator’s Role in the World Bank’s 
Fight Against Fraud and Corruption,” 39 Litigation 
38 (2013). 
Unlike their counterparts in the U.S. Govern-
ment, World Bank suspension and debarment of-
ficials may not engage in open-ended discussions 
regarding present responsibility with contractors 
facing potential debarment. See, e.g., Nadler, Ware 
and Mohr, Feature Comment, “New Developments 
In The World Bank’s Sanctions Regime,” 54 GC ¶ 
157 (noting World Bank suspension and debarment 
officials’ limited role in settlements). Instead, the 
World Bank sanctions system calls for the Bank’s 
suspension and debarment official to make a care-
ful decision on the record, calibrating the presented 
evidence against the narrowly defined categories 
of bad acts which can trigger debarment. See, e.g., 
Brown, Bribery in International Commerce § 7:28 
(West 2013). As noted, that decision, in turn, can be 
appealed to the Bank’s Sanctions Board.
Because of these subtle but critical differences 
between the two systems, while the U.S. system is 
focused on assessing the present responsibility of 
the vendor, see, e.g., FAR 9.402, 48 CFR § 9.402—
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whether the vendor has the necessary systems and 
integrity to perform suitably—the World Bank’s 
sanctions system seems to be geared more toward 
reducing fiduciary risk (the risk that Bank funds 
will be misdirected) and reputational risk (the loss 
of legitimacy caused by corruption), by punish-
ing and deterring certain bad acts. Cf., e.g., World 
Bank, “History of Sanctions Reform,” available 
at go.worldbank.org/G0YL1VLJM0 (World Bank 
“Group faced fiduciary and reputational risks when 
it had credible evidence that a firm or individual 
had engaged in fraud and corruption and the firm 
or individual remained eligible to bid on Bank 
Group-financed projects”).
The Bank’s hierarchical process, with its dis-
tinct steps and careful checks and balances, leaves 
individual Bank officials without the discretion (or 
authority) to assess the special performance risks 
(or opportunities) which a vendor may present. The 
World Bank system assumes that sanctions can and 
should be imposed for specific bad acts. Nothing in 
the Bank system suggests, for example, that the 
suspension and debarment officials would have the 
discretion to ignore a sanctionable act if doing so 
would keep a vital (but risky) contractor available 
for future competitions. Cf., e.g., Matjan, “The Self-
Cleaning Dilemma: Reconciling Competing Objectives 
of Procurement Processes,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
291 (2013) (discussing limited bases for reduction in 
World Bank sanctions). 
There is a logic to this focus, because the Bank 
(in its role as lender) does not actually administer 
contracts; it is a bank, not a procuring agency, and it 
has different stakeholders and different concerns. Cf. 
Canni, “Debarment Is No Longer Private World Bank 
Business: An Examination of the Bank’s Distinct 
Debarment Procedures Used for Corporate Procure-
ments and Financed Projects,” 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 147 
¶ 355
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(2010) (discussing World Bank debarment system for 
its own “corporate” purchases).
The U.S. system, in contrast, is much more flex-
ible. In the U.S. federal system, the debarment deci-
sion is, at its heart, a business decision, centered 
around performance risk and weighing many factors, 
including (as a practical matter) potential effects on 
future competitions. See, e.g., Manuel, “Debarment 
and Suspension of Government Contractors: An 
Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted 
and Proposed Amendments” 9 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2012) 
(“Because [under the U.S. federal system] the public 
interest encompasses both safeguarding public funds 
by excluding contractors who may be nonresponsible 
and not excluding contractors who are fundamen-
tally responsible and could otherwise compete for 
government contracts, agency officials could find 
that contractors who engaged in exclusion-worthy 
conduct should not be excluded, particularly if they 
appear unlikely to engage in similar conduct in the 
future.” (footnotes excluded)); cf. Fariello and Daly, 
supra, at 259 (“Through multiple reforms over the 
years, the Bank has moved fairly decisively away 
from its original conception of sanctions as a purely 
business decision towards a rule of law approach.”).
These are generalizations, of course, and neither 
system is “pure”: World Bank officials do consider 
contractors’ performance risk in certain contexts, and 
U.S. officials can, at times, debar contractors largely 
for reasons of reputational risk. In the main, though, 
the two systems are structured around radically dif-
ferent goals. But taken together, the parallel systems 
highlight the three key issues that arise when corrup-
tion taints public procurement: the public purchaser 
loses legitimacy (reputational risk), precious public 
funds are diverted (fiduciary risk), and the purchaser 
loses best value (performance risk, which can be 
bundled into fiduciary risk, but here is addressed as 
a distinct risk at the procuring agency level). 
Sanctions System Review and Issues—
Against this backdrop, the World Bank has under-
taken a new review of its sanctions system. See World 
Bank, “Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions 
System: Consultation Plan” (Sept. 5, 2013), avail-
able at consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/
sanctions-reviews; Bruce Zagaris, “World Bank Con-
ducts Stock-Taking of Its Sanctions System,” 29 Int’l 
Enforcement L. Rep. ¶ 354 (Sept. 2013). The World 
Bank sanctions system has been reformed a number 
of times before, and this latest review is to build on 
those earlier reforms. See, e.g., Nadler and Ware, 
Feature Comment, “The World Bank Implements New 
Sanctions Procedures,” 53 GC ¶ 41.
To frame the review, the World Bank undertook 
internal consultations, and a preliminary report on 
the initial findings was discussed with the Bank’s 
Audit Committee on March 22, 2013, in executive 
session. The preliminary report (which reportedly is 
several hundred pages long, including attachments) 
has not been released to the public; instead, a sum-
mary (an “initiating discussion brief ”) has been 
posted at the consultation website cited above.
The review is to proceed in two phases. During 
phase I, the Bank is assessing how various reforms 
have been implemented since the last round of reform 
in 2007, the impact of the sanctions regime on Bank 
operations, and the legal adequacy of the current sys-
tem “in light of current developments in national and 
international law.” “Review of the World Bank Group 
Sanctions System,” supra. In phase II, the Bank 
will “address the larger, first-principles issues of the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the system—i.e., 
whether the system as a whole is meeting its objec-
tives of excluding corrupt actors and deterring fraud 
and corruption in World Bank Group operations, at an 
appropriate cost to the World Bank Group.” Id.
Issue: Defining First Principles: Because the Bank 
has deferred consideration of first principles until 
phase II of the project (which may not occur until 
2014), it has not identified the core principles and 
purpose of the sanctions regime. As the discussion 
above reflects, as currently structured, the Bank’s 
sanctions system focuses first on fiduciary and repu-
tational risk, and does not focus on the performance 
risk that client governments may face from corrupt or 
incompetent contractors. Many of the reforms being 
considered (some of which are discussed below) would 
be easier to assess if the Bank, as a threshold matter, 
identified the core goals under the current system, 
and framed how it will assess the costs and benefits 
of addressing those goals.
Issue: Making Data Available to Public: Regard-
less of the direction chosen—for example, the Bank 
may opt to keep its focus on reputational and fidu-
ciary risks, or it may decide to take a more granular 
approach to performance risk—those first principles 
should be assessed against a more complete eviden-
tiary base. The initiating discussion brief (the sum-
mary report released by the Bank) is only 18 pages 
long, and it would be impossible to assess from that 
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brief report whether the Bank is succeeding in meet-
ing its core goals. 
Thus, for example, while the initiating discussion 
brief notes on page 8 that “over 86% of sanctions cases 
have involved fraudulent practices, of which the vast 
majority has involved forgery or other forms of misrep-
resentation in bidding documents,” one cannot discern 
from the limited data whether these misrepresentations 
in bidding actually do point to risks in performance. 
By the same token, without release of the data 
gathered to date, one cannot determine whether fur-
ther research is needed to assess possible alternative 
paths. It may, for example, be practically impossible 
for the Bank to assess the day-to-day performance 
risks that contractors pose during administration of 
Bank-financed projects—but without release of the 
preliminary data, there is no way to assess that.
Issue: Suspensions Pending Investigations: If the 
Bank broadly assesses first principles—if it concludes, 
for example, that although the sanctions system is fo-
cused on reputational and fiduciary risks, the system 
must also be mindful of costs to borrowers—it will 
be better equipped to assess some of the procedural 
adjustments that it has already proposed.
 In the summary report, the Bank proposed, for 
example, that there should be more “early temporary 
suspensions” (ETSs) pending INT investigations, 
which can take several years. This proposal may go 
even farther: one commenter from the Freshfields law 
firm noted that “there is also a suggestion to relax the 
standard to obtain an ETS by, for example, allowing 
an ETS to issue on the mere commencement of an 
INT investigation.” See also Independent Advisory 
Board (IAB), 2012 Annual Report, at 10 (February 
2013) (board report, covering work of INT, raised 
possibility of temporary suspensions based upon 
probable cause alone, at outset of investigation, to 
mitigate risks), available at siteresources.worldbank.
org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1244163232994/
IAB-2012AnnualReport.pdf. 
The proposed early suspensions could severely 
impact future competitions on Bank-financed projects. 
However, until the Bank clarifies its core principles 
(i.e., until it decides whether it is also responsible 
for ensuring adequate competition in its borrowers’ 
public procurement markets, and so should assess 
the competitive impacts of any early temporary 
suspensions), the Bank cannot fairly assess whether 
the proposed changes to the sanctions process are in 
keeping with its goals.
Issue: Suspensions Pending Settlement: The 
Bank’s summary report suggests on page 13 that 
consideration should be given to requiring firms 
under investigation to suspend further contract-
ing (through a “voluntary undertaking or ETS”) 
as a condition to entering into “major settlement 
negotiations.” If the Bank’s core goal is to protect 
its reputation, this approach is entirely logical. 
Although it would discourage firms from entering 
into settlement negotiations, this approach would 
minimize any risks of new scandals emerging dur-
ing those negotiations. If, however, the Bank instead 
concludes that encouraging settlement negotiations 
and maintaining robust competition are also core 
goals, for doing so will reduce performance risks 
for borrower nations in the long run, the Bank may 
conclude that forcing these “voluntary” suspensions 
is not a worthwhile reform.
Issue: Allowing Investigators to Appeal Deci-
sions by the Suspension and Debarment Officer: 
The Bank’s summary report suggests on page 16 
that INT should be allowed to appeal decisions by 
the Bank’s suspension and debarment officers to 
the Sanctions Board—in other words, that the in-
vestigators should be allowed to appeal a decision 
by the “gatekeeper” (the suspension and debarment 
officer) not to recommend a sanction. Once the Bank 
enunciates its first principles, it is difficult to see 
how any commonly recognized goal could be met by 
this suggestion. Even if the core goal of the sanc-
tions system is limited to a reduction in fiduciary 
and reputational risks, the summary report cites 
no evidence that the suspension and debarment 
officers have erroneously passed on cases in which 
those risks have been presented. And if the goals 
are more broadly defined to include efficiency in the 
process, there seems little logic in creating broad 
new rights of appeal in the Bank’s investigative 
arm.
Issue: Cross-Debarment: The Bank’s summary 
report also suggests “permitting the World Bank 
to refer to third-party debarments as a basis for 
ineligibility”—to open the door, in other words, 
to broader use of cross-debarment, so that when 
another nation or institution debars a contractor, 
the Bank will follow suit. While cross-debarment 
is facially appealing, discussions in the procure-
ment community (including a public colloquium at 
the George Washington University Law School on 
October 22) suggest that summary cross-debarment 
 The Government Contractor ®
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could be deeply disruptive, and might well raise 
issues of due process and proportionality. See gen-
erally Yukins, “Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder 
Analysis,” 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 219 (2013), 
available at ssrn.com/abstract=2316252; Priess, 
“Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges in 
Procurement Markets Abroad—Part III: Complexity 
and Divergence: Procurement Sanctions for Corrup-
tion—A Comparative Perspective,” 2013 Gov. Contr. 
Year in Rev. Briefs 5 (February 2013); cf. Hostetler, 
Note, “Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corpo-
rate Corruption on World Bank-Funded Infrastruc-
ture Projects,” 14 Yale Hum. Rights & Dev. L.J. 231 
(2011) (arguing World Bank investigation should 
trigger anticorruption proceedings in borrower 
nation). If the Bank concludes that its goal is not 
simply to eliminate reputational risk (a goal which 
could be met by summary cross-debarment), but 
rather more broadly to enhance performance at the 
project level, it may decide to take a more cautious 
approach to cross-debarment. 
Conclusion—As the discussion above reflects, 
while the World Bank’s review of its sanctions sys-
tem is very welcome, the Bank may wish to defer 
any conclusions regarding appropriate reforms until 
it has had an opportunity to define and assess first 
principles in its sanctions system, and has more data 
at hand to weigh the costs and benefits of proposed 
reforms.
F
This Feature Comment was written for the Gov-
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Professor Yukins (cyukins@law.gwu.edu) is the 
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